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Abstract 
More and more political attention has, in recent years, been directed towards the rise in 
income inequality that many western countries have experienced during the last decades. 
Among the questions asked by political scientists is what the possible political causes and 
consequences of this development are? One possible consequence that is sometimes referred 
to is that it threatens the unity and stability of a country: that it creates an “us and them”. This 
could, as some have argued, manifest itself as increased political polarization. There is by now 
a number of studies done on the relationship between income inequality and political 
polarization. This study adds to these by analyzing the relationship between income inequality 
and how polarized the public’s attitudes to redistribution are in 74 countries throughout the 
world. It finds that there is in fact a strong correlation between income inequality and 
polarization across countries. A multilevel analysis is then performed at the micro level to 
explore possible explanations for this correlation. The results from the analysis show that it 
cannot, as some previous research have argued, be explained by greater differences in 
attitudes between high and low income earners. Instead, it is differences within each income 
group, or throughout the income distribution, that is greater in more unequal countries. 
Finally, the study uses the longitudinal nature of the World Value Survey and European Value 
Study to perform an analysis over time, where it is shown that changes in income inequality 
has not lead to subsequent changes in polarization. 
 
Key words: Income inequality, political polarization, economic redistribution, mass polarization 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the start of the 1980s almost all OECD countries have experienced a substantial rise in 
income inequality. An important factor behind this change has been the increasing share of 
the national income going to the top percentages of households (Atkinson, 2016; Atkinson, 
Piketty & Saez, 2011, p.5). Only looking at the top income earners is, however, not enough as 
many countries have experienced increased differences in other parts of the income 
distribution as well (Atkinson, 2016). One striking example of this is the rise in the number of 
people living beneath the relative poverty line in traditionally egalitarian countries like 
Sweden and Germany (Atkinson, 2016, p.29; OECD, 2011, p.5). This has impacted the public 
debate throughout the world: ranging from an economic book about income inequality that 
became an international best seller (Piketty, 2014), to the occupy Wall Street movement and 
Bernie Sanders election campaign in the US. In light of this there are more and more 
political scientists that have taken up studying political factors connected to the rise in income 
inequality. One example of this is research on the effect that income inequality may have on 
political polarization (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; McCarty, Poole and Rosentahl, 2006; 
Voorheise, McCarty and Shor, 2015). 
 
Political polarization occurs when the differences in ideology and policies of political parties 
and/or voters increases. It is described in the political science literature as problematic for a 
number of reasons: it makes political compromises harder, thus leading to legislative 
inefficiency and gridlock (Barber & McCarty, 2015, pp.38-44). Political polarization has also 
been connected to political instability, corruption, democratic breakdowns, inequality and 
lower trust for politicians (Svensson, 1998; Valenzuela, 1978; Voorheis, McCarty & Shor, 
2015). On the other hand, there are positive aspects of having some degree of polarization: 
voters have a greater variety of political alternatives to choose from and opposing parties can 
work as a safe guard against corrupt practices and bad policies (Lupu, 2013; Brown,Touchton 
& Whithford, 2011). 
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There are, despite of this a priori logical connection, few empirical studies on the relationship 
between income inequality and political polarization. Those that have been done have mainly 
focused on polarization within the party system or on one specific country (mainly the US). 
The conclusions from these studies are mixed: with some arguing that inequality increases 
party system polarization and others that it actually decreases it (Pontusson & Rueda, 2008; 
Finseraas, Moene & Bath, 2015). There are several shortcomings in this body of literature: 
first, that there are too few of them in order to be able to draw any general conclusions; 
secondly, that the ones that have been done have been restricted to a smaller number of 
OECD-countries, and; lastly, that they mostly focus on polarization between political parties 
and thereby leave out the electorate. 
 
The aim of this study is to fill some of these gaps by examining the relationship between 
income inequality and how polarized a country´s electorate is in their attitudes to economic 
redistribution. I choose to focus on attitudes to economic redistribution since this is a political 
issue that is highly related to income inequality. Insufficient redistributive policies are often 
viewed as an explanation for income inequality and as a way of remedying it. Attitudes 
towards redistribution and the welfare state have also been one of the main dividing lines in 
politics, between voters and parties that characterize themselves as either “left” or “right” 
(Alesina, Giuliano, 2009, p.2; Svallfors, 1997, p.290). Polarization in attitudes to 
redistribution might therefore have a substantial impact on the political system: for example, 
by making parties more polarized, heightening political tension and conflict, and hindering 
political compromises to improve redistributive policies. 
 
The results from the study are based on three analyses: First, an OLS multiple regression 
analysis of 74 countries, where the relationship between income inequality and polarization is 
tested. The results show that income inequality correlates strongly with polarization in 
attitudes to economic redistribution, even when relevant control variables are added. 
Secondly, a multilevel regression analysis is performed in order to test if a country´s level of 
income inequality affects differences (polarization) in attitudes between people with a higher 
or lower income/education level. Interestingly, low income earners were not more “left” and 
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high income earners more “right” in more unequal countries. Instead, it is greater differences 
within all income groups, or throughout the entire income distribution, that explains why more 
unequal countries are more polarized. 
 
The last part of the paper analyses if changes in income inequality over time has led to 
changes in polarization. This is done by studying countries whose residents have answered the 
survey questions three times or more between 1989 and 2013. The results indicate that there 
is no relationship between changes in income inequality and subsequent changes in 
polarization in attitudes to economic redistribution. The study thereby adds to the gaps in the 
previous research by: 1) analyzing the relationship between income inequality and 
polarization in the electorate across a wide range of countries; 2) by studying the relationship 
over time; 3) by illustrating that the relationship is driven by an increase in polarization 
throughout the income distribution and not by greater differences between those with a higher 
or lower income/education level, and; 4) by providing an outline for a theoretical framework 
that explains the relationship. 
 
The research questions are the following: 
• Is there are a cross-country correlation between income inequality and polarization? 
• What factors can explain this correlation? 
• Have changes in income inequality lead to changes in levels of polarization? 
 
 
The aim of the paper is, in other words, to answer the following questions regarding the 
relationship between income inequality and polarization: if there is a correlation, how it can 
be explained and if it is a causal relationship. The paper proceeds as follows: first, a 
presentation of the main concepts and previous research is given. After that a theoretical 
framework is outlined as well as a discussion regarding methodology and operationalization 
of variables. Finally, the results from the analyses are presented, ending with a discussion and 
concluding remarks. 
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2. CONCEPTS AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
2.1. The Rise in Income Inequality 
Since the 1980s there has been a substantial increase in income inequality in most advanced 
democracies. This change constitutes a major reversal of the major reduction in income 
inequality that happened during the three decades following World War II (Piketty, 2014, 
pp.316-324; Atkinson, 2015, pp.214-215). The rise in inequality has, however, by no means 
followed a symmetrical trajectory across countries. First off, there are great differences 
between countries in how big the increase has been. Some countries, like the US, Britain and 
Australia, have witnessed increases in their gini coefficients of approximately 7, 9 and 6 
points between 1980 and 2010 (on a 0-100 scale) (calculations based on Solt, 2014). France 
and Denmark, on the other hand, have had practically no increase in income inequality at all 
since the 80s (Atkinson, 2015, p.214). Other advanced democracies place themselves in- 
between these extremes. The same is true of developing countries: income inequality has, for 
example, decreased during the last decade in Brazil, whereas China is among the countries 
where it has increased the most (calculations based on Solt, 2014). 
 
Another important aspect of the general rise in inequality is that countries differ significantly 
in the timing of changes in inequality. Practically the entire rise in inequality in Great Britain, 
for example, happened during the 1980s, Canada´s in the 1990s and the US have had a 
steadier increase during all three decades (Atkinson, 2015, p.213-214). The fact that the 
general rise in inequality is heterogeneous across countries makes it suited for the type of 
panel data analysis that I will perform in the last part of the paper, since there is a good deal 
of variation to be explained. 
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Figure 1. Changes in gini coefficient net of taxes and transfers 
 
 
Note: Gini coefficient is measured as averages over three years; the year before, during and after the observation. 
Source: Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality Database, version 5.0, October 2014. 
 
 
 
2.2. Political Polarization 
Political polarization can mean a number of different things within the political science 
literature. One commonly used measurement is the standard deviation in ideological 
positioning of the parties in parliament or the electorate (Neusser & Johnstone, 2014, p.4). 
The standard deviation is measured as the average difference between every party’s (voter´s) 
placement on an ideological left-right scale and the mean placement. Parties that are located 
further away from the mean therefore contribute to a higher standard deviation. Besides this, 
it is common to describe the degree to which parties or the electorate is sorted along some 
group affiliation as polarization (Hetherington, 2009, p.436; Abramovitz & Saunders, 2008, 
pp.546-547). A party system is more sorted if representatives from the left and right parties 
hold views that are closely in line with other representatives from their party, but sharply 
distinct from those belonging to other parties. An electorate is likewise described as sorted if 
people´s opinions on most policy issues are similar to others who support the same party, 
while being different from those supporting other parties (Hetherington, 2009, p.436). 
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Finally, it is important to make a distinction between polarization within the party system and 
the electorate. Scholars´ often describe what they are analyzing as political polarization, even 
though research has shown that it can be big differences between polarization of the party 
system and electorate (Fiorina, 2008). In this study I will focus on the standard deviation of 
the population´s attitudes to economic redistribution as my measure of polarization. The 
diagram below illustrates how I do this by showing the country whose population was the 
second most polarized in their views (Jordan) about whether incomes should be made more 
equal or not and the one whose population was the least polarized (Thailand). The graph to 
the left shows the most polarized country and the one to the right the least polarized one. 
Figure 2. Dispersion of attitudes to economic redistribution in the country with the second highest average 
standard deviation (left) and lowest standard deviation (right) 
 
 
Source: WVS Longitudinal Data File; EVS Longitudinal Data file 
 
 
The aim of this study is, in other words, to test if income inequality makes a countries 
population more polarized in line with the drastic dispersion of attitudes represented by 
the left graph of Jordan. 
 
2.3. Party system polarization 
In this subsection I go through the most important insights from the previous research that has 
been done on party system polarization. The reason for doing so is that polarization within the 
electorate (which this study focuses on) is highly connected to polarization in the party 
system. Most of the theoretical underpinning in the research about party system polarization 
rests on the assumption that parties shift their positioning in response to the electorate (Lupu, 
2015, pp.333-336; Ezrow et al., 2014, p.1559). That is, it is taken for granted that party 
system and electoral polarization go together. It is therefore relevant to analyze and 
understand the consequences of polarization within the party system since this could be the 
result of electoral polarization. 
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A majority of the studies of party polarization have focused on the American party system, 
where there is more or less a consensus that representatives from the two main parties have 
become more sorted along party lines (Barber & McCarty, 2015, p.23). This development 
started in the late 1970s and has since then steadily increased (ibid, pp.19-21). There is still no 
agreed upon explanatory variables for this. Studies have argued and found some support for 
factors like: gerrymandering; less contested primary elections; increased income inequality; 
the electoral system; institutional factors within parties and the parliament  that  make  it 
harder to break party lines, and; a more polarized media landscape (ibid; McCarty & Shor, 
2016). 
 
The theoretical framework commonly used when studying party polarization is some form of 
elaboration of the spatial model of voting behavior first popularized by Anthony Downs 
(1957). Downs argued that the policies pursued by political parties are determined by the 
parties’ perception of the preferences of the electorate and the policy position taken by 
competing parties. Voters, which lack perfect information about the parties’ policies, place 
themselves on an ideological left-right scale in accordance with their perceived interest. They 
then support the party they think is located closest to them on the scale. A more polarized 
electorate should therefore lead to a more polarized party system (Downs, 1957). Downs also 
argued that parties, or coalitions of parties, gravitate towards the median voter in order to 
capture a majority of the electorate. This is a condition that subsequent analysis of party 
polarization has relaxed in different ways, which is why electoral polarization can lead to 
party system polarization (see for example: Grofman, 2004; Finseraas, Moene & Bath, 2015, 
pp.565-566). 
 
In his seminal work on party systems Giovanni Sartori described polarization of party systems 
as a difficult challenge for multiparty electoral democracies (Sartori, 1976; Sani & Sartori, 
1983). He argued that polarized pluralism systems can give rise to extreme “anti-system” 
parties and a stretching out of the parliamentary parties along the ideological spectrum 
(Sartori, 1976, p.132). There is therefore a risk that antagonism and mistrust towards 
politicians develop up to the point where it risks leading to internal strife and democratic 
breakdowns. 
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Examples of countries where scholars have described the trajectory of events leading up to a 
democratic break-down in this way are Chile under Salvador Allende´s government, the 
Weimar republic and the Austrian democracy during the 1930s (Dalton, 2008, p.900; Sartori, 
1976, pp.131-145; Valenzuela, 1978). 
 
The consequence of party polarization that has gotten the strongest empirical and theoretical 
support is that it leads to more inefficient governments and legislative gridlock (Barber & 
McCarty, 2015, pp.35-44). Research has, for example, tied polarization to fewer laws being 
passed and that it heightens the obstructionist tendencies of veto players, thus making it 
harder for governments to effectively respond to economic challenges (ibid, pp.38-39; 
Tsebelis, 1999, p.591). Others have argued that party polarization makes the electorate more 
sorted along partisan lines since they perceive the political system as more polarized (Lupu, 
2013; Adams, Green and Milazzo, 2012). 
 
Dettrey and Palmer (2015) argues that political partisanship in the US have contributed to the 
rise in income inequality there. The reason for this is, according to them, that increased 
legislative partisanship makes the parties cater to their core constituents to a larger degree. In 
the case of the US this has meant that Democratic governments have preferred expansionary 
fiscal policies aimed at reducing unemployment, whereas Republican governments have had 
more “stock-market friendly” policies. Low-income earners have loosed more from this than 
those with higher incomes, since they are more affected by unemployment than high income 
earners are by falls in the stock market. Dettrey and Palmer´s findings illustrate that the 
relationship between income inequality and political polarization might be bi-directional, 
meaning that they reinforce each other.  This is a point that has been raised by other scholars 
as    well    (Pontusson    &    Rueda,    2008;    Vorhouse,     McCarty    and    Shor,       2015). 
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2.4. Voter polarization 
As with the party system, there is a consensus among scholars that there has been a substantial 
increase in partisan sorting among the American electorate. A study from the PEW research 
center in 2014 of 10 000 Americans` answers to 10 value questions found that there is a 
considerable divide based upon which of the two parties one sympathizes with. The 10 
questions make up a conservative-liberal index. The number of republican voters that were 
placed to the right (conservative side) of the median democrat on the value scale has gone 
from 64 % in 1994 to 92 % today and the change for democratic voters is from 70 to 94 %. 
The proportion of self-reported democrats and republicans who viewed the other party very 
unfavorably has more than doubled since 1994, and there are more who believe that the other 
party is a threat to the nation (Pew Research Center, 2014). This development has been 
reaffirmed by other studies as well (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008, pp.546-548; Layman, 
Carsey & Horowitz, 2006, pp.98-90; Hetherington, 2009, pp.436-441) 
 
Morris Fiorina, among others, has been critical of labeling this development as an increase in 
polarization of the American electorate (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Fiorina, 2014; Baker, 
2005). They have given convincing evidence that Americans` views on policy issues have 
actually not become more extreme during this period. By investigating National Election 
Studies Fiorina (2008) finds that the standard deviation of American´s views on policy issues 
have not changed between 1984 and 2004. People in general had very similar ideological 
views as 20 years earlier and the same was true for the average standard deviation on 
questions about policy issues. These findings support those of DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 
(1988) who studied the degree of polarization in American´s views on a wide range of policy 
issues between 1972 and 1994. 
A common view among scholars has been that partisan sorting has declined in western 
democracies during recent decades. The argument behind this supposed decline is based on 
modernization theory and a decline in voting based on class cleavages. Voters are believed to 
have become more independent, mobile and less attached to any one social group; like a 
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political party (Jensen, 2011, pp.510-511; Poletti, 2015, p.245; Berglund et al., 2005, pp.123- 
125; Dalton, 1984). Others have questioned this by arguing that placement on the left/right 
ideological scale is still as good a predictor of party choice as before in western countries (van 
der Eijk & Schmitt, 2005, pp.180-187). Few studies have been done outside of America that 
measures electoral polarization as how disbursed or extreme voters` views on policy issues are 
(the standard deviation). Those that have been done have found a stable level of polarization, 
or depolarization, in the Netherlands, Britain and across European countries over time 
(Adams, De Vries & Leither, 2012; Adams, Green & Milazzo, 2012; Bartels, 2013; Neusser, 
Johnston & Bodet, 2014). Studies that analyses variables that can explain differences in 
polarization (standard deviation) across countries are even less common. Examples of these 
are: Lindqvist and Östling (2010) that found a significant relationship between polarization 
and the size of government; Grechyna (2016) who, in an exploratory analysis of the best 
determinants of attitudinal polarization at the country level, found these to be income 
inequality and social trust, and; studies by Adams De Vries and Leither (2012) and Adams, 
Green and Milazzo (2012) that found a connection between polarization in the party system 
and the electorate. 
 
The body of research described above illustrates why more research on electoral polarization, 
as measured by the standard deviation, is needed. First, it is inaccurate to argue that 
polarization has increased or decreased solely based on the level of partisan sorting. As 
previous research has shown: the different measurements of political polarization do not 
always move in the same direction. Secondly, there is still a big vacuum to fill when it comes 
to explaining differences between countries in this particular form of polarization and why it 
changes over time. 
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2.5. Income Inequality and Political Polarization 
Research about the relationship between income inequality and political polarization started 
gaining traction after it first was discovered how partisanship in the US congress had risen in 
tandem with income inequality since the 1970s (McCarty & Shor, 2015, p.5). Most of this 
research has been done in relation to the American case and have reached somewhat mixed 
conclusions. Voorheis, McCarthy and Shor (2015) have found that increased inequality has 
been associated with a substantial and statistical significant increase in polarization within 
state legislatures. Rising inequality was associated with a shift to the left for the median 
democratic legislature and to the right for the republican one. Dettrey and Campbell (2013), 
on the other hand, argue that income inequality has not lead to a more polarized electorate in 
the US. They show that high income earners are not more conservative than before and low 
income earners not more liberal. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) found that income in 
the US has become a stronger predictor of voters party choice in the last decades, but that very 
little of this change can be explained by rising income inequality. 
 
Cross sectional analysis of this relationship have also come to different conclusions: 
Pontusson and Rueda (2008) analyzes the effect of income inequality on party system 
polarization in 12 OECD countries. Their results indicate that rising wage inequality is 
associated with more leftist left parties at medium or high levels of low-income mobilization, 
whereas rising household income inequality is associated with more conservative right parties 
at low or medium levels of low income mobilization. Finseraas, Moene and Bath (2015) use 
the same measure of political polarization (party manifestos) as Pontusson and Rueda but 
reach the opposite conclusion. They find that rising income inequality leads to a rightward 
shift among left parties and thus a reduction in party system polarization. 
 
Iversen and Soskice (2015) shed light on a previously overlooked relationship between 
income inequality and ideological polarization among the electorates in 21 advanced western 
democracies. They find that countries with a higher level of income inequality also had an 
electorate that placed themselves more to the middle ideologically. The explanation that they 
give for this is that more egalitarian countries have a higher level of unionization and low- 
income mobilization: factors that both increase ideological polarization and reduces income 
inequality. 
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Finally, Lindqvist and Östling (2010), and Grechyna (2016), point towards a correlation 
between income inequality and how polarized a country`s population is in their attitudes to 
different economic policy questions: among others, the same questions measuring attitudes to 
redistribution as the ones used in this study. 
 
To conclude, the results from the relationship between income inequality and party 
polarization are mixed, but there seems to be a causal connection in the case of US state 
assemblies (Voorheis, McCarthy and Shor, 2015). There are, however, hardly any studies 
testing inequalities effect on electoral polarization in a cross-country setting. The limited 
numbers of studies that have done so have done it in a more indirect way and the results from 
these studies indicate that there is a connection between inequality and electoral polarization 
as measured by the standard deviation (Lindqvist & Östling, 2010; Grechyna, 2016). 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
The focal relationship that I am interested in is the effect that income inequality has on 
attitudes to income redistribution and the role the government should have in redistributing 
incomes. Income inequality is hypothesized to cause increased voter polarization through two 
main causal mechanisms: by changing the relative distribution of income and by making 
education more unevenly distributed. It is also hypothesized that having a political left culture 
is associated with both lower income inequality and less polarization in attitudes to 
redistribution. Political left culture is therefore described as an antecedent variable in the 
theoretical model. It is important in explaining why there is a relationship, but not why 
income inequality leads to increased polarization. Below is a presentation of the three 
explanatory variables: 
 
3.1. The income effect 
This part of the theoretical model builds on other studies on income inequality, attitudes to 
redistribution and political polarization, and assumes that voters´ preferences for 
redistributive policies are mostly driven by rational pocket book concerns (Pontusson & 
Rueda, 2008, pp.312-313; Meltzer & Richards, 1981, p.914). A voter with an income well 
behind the mean income will have more to gain from having services like health care and 
education paid for through taxes. The same is true of public transfers like child benefits, 
unemployment insurance and paid sick leave. The reason for this is that taxes are progressive 
and the possible deadweight losses in income from these policies to a lower-income 
household will typically be outweighed by the gains they make from redistribution. The 
opposite is true the higher up in the income latter one goes, where those at the top have the 
most to lose from progressive taxation (Pontusson & Rueda, 2008, pp.314-319). The costs in 
taxes for a millionaire clearly outweigh the gains he makes from welfare services and 
transfers many times over. The data from voting records confirm this general pattern: higher 
income is associated with voting more conservative and having a less favorable view on 
redistribution (Barth, Finseraas & Moene, 2014, p.1; Svallfors, 1999, p.293). Indeed, this 
seems to be even truer for those at the absolute top of the income distribution (Page, Bartels 
& Seawright, 2013, p.51). 
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Based on this theory a more polarized income distribution should lead to a more polarized 
distribution of views on redistributive economic policies. The graph to the left below depicts 
an uneven distribution of income and the one to the right an even one. It shows that voters to 
the left and right have a greater incentive to hold more polarized views when incomes are 
distributed more unevenly. The main reason being, that they simply have more to gain/loose 
from a shift of the mean income towards the median one. 
Figure 3. Examples of uneven (left) distribution of income and even (right) 
 
 
Note: inspiration for the graph from Ponusson and Rueda (2008, p.316) 
Given that inequality pushes the median income away from the mean one, one might expect 
that it should lead to a left skewed polarization where the population in general becomes more 
in favor of redistribution. This is indeed what the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model predicts. The 
theory I present, however, argues that it is difficult for people along the middle of the income 
distribution to know which level of redistribution they should prefer. Voters between the 
mean and median income is, for example, often net contributors to the public sectors. The 
degree to which they gain/loose from redistribution in the short run depends on how healthy 
they are, if they have kids, their age, and so forth. It is furthermore, difficult to have good 
knowledge of the level of income inequality in one´s country and the costs/benefits associated 
with redistributive policies. Increased income inequality is therefore assumed to heighten the 
ideological conflict (polarization) between those at the opposite ends of the income 
distribution, who will find it easier to know if they gain/loose more from redistribution, while 
those in the middle are more uncertain. The issue of redistribution might therefore become 
more salient, which could further increase polarization/sorting of voters since the differences 
between parties become clearer for voters (Adams, De Vries, & Leiter, 2012; Lupu,2013). 
median mean median mean 
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3.2. The educational effect 
The research on this topic is not conclusive, but overall it does seem as though higher income 
inequality entails greater differences in educational opportunities (Tselios, 2014, pp.221-222; 
2008, pp.409-410; Perotti, 1996, p.82). Firstly, higher inequality means that children from 
lower income household are relatively more economically disadvantaged compared to those 
from middle or high-income households. Their parents might, for example, be less capable of 
helping them with schoolwork and to pay tuitions for higher education (Tselios, 2014, 
pp.221-222). Secondly, income inequality is correlated with having a smaller public sector at 
the country level (Elgin et al., 2010, p.18). This could mean that the public sector has fewer 
resources to invest in education and to make sure that everyone gets equal educational 
opportunities at all levels. Lastly, income inequality causes residential segregation, which in 
turn might lead to more unequal educational opportunities by making schools more 
segregated (Orfield & Lee, 2004; Lee, 2004). 
 
Education, on the other hand, is an important predictor of people´s political attitudes and 
party choice (Rindermann, Flores-Mendoza & Woodley, 2011, p.1). Research at the micro 
level has found a connection between higher education and factors like: greater participation 
in the political process; better political knowledge; more democratic attitude towards politics, 
and; being more skeptical towards economic redistribution (Habibov, 2014, p.43; Lijphart, 
1997, pp.1-2; Hillygus, 2005, p.25). It is, with this in mind, possible that greater educational 
differences also lead to more polarized views about economic redistribution. Most 
importantly, is the fact that education makes it more likely that people will participate in the 
political debate (passively or actively) (Lijphart, 1997, pp.1-2) and therefore assimilate their 
views to those of others; something that may reduce how extremely and randomly the average 
person deviates from the mean. Some of inequalities effect on polarization is therefore 
assumed to be caused (mediated) by differences in educational opportunities. 
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3.3. Political left culture 
This part of the theoretical explanation builds on the institutional theory of welfare regimes 
(Svallfors, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1990) and assumes that having a “left political culture” 
reduces inequality and leads to less polarization in attitudes to economic redistribution. What 
constitutes having a left political culture is here defined as having: a) a comparably high 
amount of government social expenditures and an ambitious welfare state, and; b) that welfare 
services are provided in a more universal manner. Scholars` have argued that having a more 
comprehensive and universal welfare state leads to broader support for ambitious welfare 
services (Boräng, 2015, pp.219-220; Rothstein, 1998). One reason for this is that discussions 
about welfare services and government transfers becomes less about the groups that benefits 
or loses from it, and instead more about solving common problems and what should be done 
from a general fairness perspective (Boräng, 2015, pp.219-220). The fact that welfare services 
and transfer systems cover more people means that more affluent groups will have had greater 
experience with them. They might therefore feel as if they too gain from them and therefore 
support them to a greater degree (Rothstein, 1998). 
 
There are also studies that have connected a comprehensive welfare state with higher levels of 
generalized trust (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Trusting others, as well as public institutions 
(institutional trust), makes it less likely that people will believe that others abuse the 
government sector for their own gains. Finally, it might simply be the case that people who 
live in welfare states have grown accustomed to a certain degree of government intervention 
and redistribution (Arts & Gelissen, 2001, p.296), and therefore the support for  it is  broader. 
It could be harder for people, living in countries with a less developed welfare state, to know 
what the appropriate level of redistribution ought to be. This might then explain why they 
deviate more in their attitudes from one another. All of these factors  have  been connected to 
greater overall support for the welfare sector (Rothstein, 1998; Boräng, 2015), but it is 
obvious that they might lead to smaller differences in opinion within countries as well (less 
polarization). In fact, much of the reasoning in the literature about institutional theory and 
welfare states, is centered on how support for welfare becomes broadened (less polarized) in 
countries with more comprehensive welfare regimes, and not just deepened within each 
societal group (Rothstein, 1998). Political left culture is therefore hypothesized to work as an 
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antecedent variable in the theoretical model: leading to both income inequality and 
polarization, i.e., as coming before (anteceding) them in the causal chain. 
 
To sum up, it is hypothesized that these three explanatory variables are important in 
explaining why there is a correlation between income inequality and polarization in attitudes 
to redistribution across countries. Besides testing whether this relationship exists or not when 
relevant control variables are added, this study will also empirically examine how well these 
variables explain the correlation. 
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4. Methodology and Data 
 
In this section I will go through the methodology used in the three different analyses, as well 
as how I have gathered the data and operationalized the variables. 
 
4.1. Macro level OLS multiple regression analysis 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis was performed in order to test 
the relationship between income inequality and polarization in attitudes to economic 
redistribution across countries. There are a number of core assumptions about the data that 
need to be accounted for when performing an OLS regression analysis. Violation of these 
assumptions can lead to biased estimations of the models predictive capacity (the R2) or the 
size and significance of the coefficients (Field, 2009, pp.215-216, pp.220-221). It is therefore 
important to test for the occurrences of these problems in order to better understand ones 
results and to possibly adjust the data. The regular array of data diagnostic tests was therefore 
performed and they showed that it was not necessary to adjust the data in any way1. The only 
thing that was changed, was that Belarus, China and Kazakhstan was dropped from the model 
where parliamentary fractionalization was included. The reason for this being that one party 
dominated these countries` assemblies to such an extreme degree. 
 
4.1.2. Variables 
The dependent variables for polarization in attitudes to economic redistribution are 
operationalized from two questions that have been used in the World Value Survey (WVS) 
and European Value Study (EVS) since the second WVS wave in 1990-1994. Both the WVS 
and EVS uses elaborate sampling methods in order to make sure that the respondents 
answering the surveys make up a representative sample of the country`s population. 
 
 
 
 
1The Durbin Watson score for the full models in the regression analysis were 2.22 and 1.85 for the two dependent variables 
on a scale from 1-4. 2 indicate no serial autocorrelation, so the scores come sufficiently close to that (Fields, 2009: 220). The 
highest VIF-value and tolerance values were 2.55 and .91, which means that there should not be any problems with 
multicollinearity (ibid: 224). The highest leverage value was .39 and DF-beta values ranged from -0.18 to 0.16. DF-beta 
values above 1 are described as highly problematic by Field (2009) and mine are of course way below this: some countries 
were, however, removed in the model with fractionalization due to extreme values (as is discussed in the method section). 
Finally, the hettest command in stata was performed to test for heteroscedasticity. The results from this tests indicated that the 
null hypothesis of heteroscedasticity could be rejected. 
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The surveys are then conducted through interviews by trained personal or “professional 
organizations” and the sample size are at least 1000 respondents from each country (European 
Value Study, 2016; World Value Survey, 2016). Both of these surveys have regularly asked 
the same two identical questions about economic redistribution. I have therefore merged the 
data from both surveys in order to get more observations for the countries. Both questions 
consist of a scale from 1-10, with two statements on the opposite ends of the scales. The 
respondents are asked to pick a number on the scale in accordance with how much they agree 
with the statements (World Value Survey Longitudinal Data file, first released 2015-04-18; 
EVS Longitudinal Datafile, 2015-10-30). The statements that the respondents had to choose 
between are presented in the table: 
 
 
Table 1. Wordings of the questions of the dependent variables 
 
Economic redistribution How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means that you 
completely agree with the statement “Incomes should be made more 
equal” and 10 mean that you completely agree with the statement “We 
need larger income differences as incentives”. 
 
 
The government´s role in economic redistribution How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means that you 
completely agree with the statement “People should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves” and 10 means that you 
completely agree with the statement “The government should 
take more responsibility ensure that everyone is provided for” 
 
Note: The wordings of the questions have been abbreviated 
 
The first question is clearly a valid measurement of the population’s general attitude to future 
redistributive policies. A common criticism of using this type of questions when measuring 
differences in countries attitudes to redistribution is that all countries obviously have different 
current levels of redistribution to start with. 
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Being critical of “more equal incomes” in Sweden does not mean that one is less favorable of 
a certain level of redistribution than someone from a country with less government 
involvement that answers more positively (Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2001). 
 
This is, however, not a problem in this study since what I want to measure is the degree of 
polarization within the electorate and not the overall approval or disapproval of redistribution. 
The second question is also a valid measurement of peoples´ attitude to government 
involvement in redistributive policies. It is, however, important to note that the questions 
cover somewhat different features of economic redistribution. The first one is more abstract 
and general in that it asks about incomes being more equal without providing any description 
of how this is supposed to be achieved. It is possible that someone might be skeptical of the 
government taking care of people needs, while still thinking that equality in general is 
positive. They also differ from each other in that the first one implicitly departs from the 
present level of redistribution by asking if incomes should be made more equal. Whereas the 
other question asks what the ideal level of government involvement in redistributing incomes 
should be. Overall the questions do, however, capture attitudes to economic redistribution in a 
rather similar and general way, and I will therefore refer to them as simply “attitudes to 
economic redistribution” throughout the paper. In the result section I present the results from 
the models with the respective dependent variables separately. As it turns out, the dependent 
variables are highly correlated with one another and the regression models all point in the 
same direction. 
 
For the cross sectional regression analysis I took the last year that the countries had been 
included in the surveys within the time span 2006-2013. Countries that had not answered the 
survey within this time span were omitted, which meant a sample size of 74 different 
countries (for  a list  of the countries  and  the  year they answered the survey see  Appendix 
3). There were a few countries for which there were no data for gini coefficients the last year 
they answered the survey. I then included the year these countries had answered the surveys 
prior to this, given that it was within the 2006-2013 time frame. There was quite a bit of 
variation in how disbursed (polarized) the countries` answers were which makes it more 
plausible   to   identify   independent   variables   that   can   explain these differences: 
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Table 2. Countries with lowest and highest polarization on question about whether incomes should be made more 
equal or not 
 
Rank Lowest Std. Rank   Highest Std. 
1 Thailand 1.88 67 Vietnam 3.12 
2 Slovenia 2.15 68 Philippines 3.12 
3 Japan 2.16 69 South Africa 3.14 
4 Austria 2.24 70 Moldova 3.17 
5 Ethiopia 2.24 71 Montenegro 3.17 
6 Estonia 2.26 72 Armenia 3.20 
7 Norway 2.26 73 Mexico 3.32 
8 Netherlands 2.28 74 Romania 3.43 
9 Indonesia 2.29 75 Jordan 3.54 
10 Hungary 2.30 76 India 3.72 
Note: The idea for this and the previous descriptive table comes from Östling & Lindqvist (2010, p.547). 
Sources: European Value Study, Longitudinal Data File; World Value Survey, Longitudinal Data File 
 
The main independent variable in the analysis is the countries level of income inequality as 
measured by their gini coefficient net of taxes and transfers. The data for the countries gini 
coefficients are taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). It is 
measured on a scale from 0-100, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality. 
SWIID is widely used in academic research since it provides the fullest comparable coverage 
of countries over time. SWIID uses data from most of the existing data sources on income 
inequality and then performs multiple imputation models in order to produce measurements 
for gini coefficients for “174 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to present” 
(Solt, 2014). The gini coefficient from the Luxembourg Income Study is used as the main 
benchmark to which it strives to compare itself to. 
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The SWIID database consists of numerous imputed models for the gini coefficient net of 
taxes and transfers that can be summarized into one measure (gini_net), which is the one I 
have used in this study (Solt, 2014; Jenkins, 2014). The reason for using the gini coefficient 
net of taxes and transfers is because it is the amount of money that people actually dispose of 
which matters the most to them. Another reason is that it includes people who do not get a 
wage (market) income, which makes it a better description of the level of income inequality 
in a country. Finally, the variable for income inequality is the average gini coefficient for 
three years: the year before the country answered the WVS or EVS, the same year as they did 
so and the year following that. This is a way of adjusting for possible differences in how the 
measures for the gini coefficients are computed in the countries, as well as fluctuations caused 
by temporary macroeconomic events. 
 
My measure for educational opportunity comes from the United Nations Development 
Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Reports and measures the average year of schooling 
within the countries. That is, how many years of education the average citizen has had (United 
Nations Development Program, 2015). I consider this to be the best way of operationalizing 
the educational opportunities that a country`s citizens` has had2. 
 
Political left culture is operationalized through three variables. First, the countries level of 
public expenditures as measured by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The data for this 
variable was retrieved from the University of Gothenburg`s Quality of Government (QoG) 
Standard Time-Series Dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). It is made up of the average level of 
government expenditure during a three-year period: one year before the survey, the same year 
as it and the year following it. Three year averages were chosen because public expenditures 
tend to go up as a percentage of GDP during economic downturns and down during upturns. 
It is therefore appropriate to take an average in order to smooth out yearly fluctuations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 Besides this, a variable for differences in educational opportunities was constructed. This was done by taking the countries` 
average standard deviation to a question about respondents’ education level in the WVS and EVS. This variabledid, 
however, turn out to correlate very weakly with both income inequality and the dependent variables, which is why it is not 
included in the analysis. 
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There are obvious validity problems with this measure of “political left culture”: countries 
with big public expenditures devoted to other things than welfare services and social transfers 
receive too high figures; having a lower GDP leads to a higher public expenditure to GDP 
ratio, without this having anything to do with welfare, and; it does not capture the universality 
of welfare services and transfer systems. Despite this, it is still the most accurate way of 
operationalizing the variable in order to get data for all of the countries. 
 
The other two variables used to operationalize left political culture were the government`s 
level of social expenditures as a percentage of GDP and the proportion of workers belonging 
to a trade union. These variables capture left culture in a more precise way, but are, on the 
other hand, only available for mostly OECD-countries. These variables are therefore only 
included in one of the models in the regression analysis3. The level of social expenditures 
were received  from  the  QoG  Standard  Tim-Series  Dataset,  and  union  density from 
Hayter  and Stoevska (2011) and the OECD`s (2016) trade union density data. 
 
The most important control variable in the analysis that is not part of the theoretical 
framework is the countries level of economic development. This is measured by taking the 
logarithm of the countries per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity. The data for 
GDP was taken from the QoG Standard Time-Series Dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). Finally, a 
variable for the fractionalization of the country`s parliaments is included. This measures the 
odds of two random legislators being from different parties on a scale from 0-1. The argument 
that the number of parties in a country´s parliament is important for the degree of political 
polarization has always been an established part of the literature on the subject (Sartori, 
1976: 131-145; Pontusson & Rueda, 2008: 332). This variable was also retrieved from the 
QoG Standard Time-Series Dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Besides this, variables were constructed for the average ideological positioning of the countries` parliamentary parties and 
the citizens average self-placement on the left/right scale. None of these variables correlated in any meaningful way with the 
dependent variables, which is why they were not include in the analysis. 
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The table below shows some descriptive statistics of the variables  used: 
Table. 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. Min Max 
Gini 73 35.17 7.96 23.78 59.11 
GDP 74 24 106 18 402 858 94 169 
Gov. expenditure 74 36.53 10.51 14.13 54.22 
Soc. expenditure 34 20.71 5.93 7.80 29.81 
Fractionalization 67 .65 0.16 0.13 0.91 
Schooling 74 9.69 2.74 1.3 13.42 
Std.Gov. 
redistribution 
74 2.67 0.35 2.12 3.52 
Std. redistribution 74 2.70 0.34 1.88 2.70 
 
 
4.2. Micro level multilevel analysis 
Multilevel models are a way of analyzing data that is nested in multiple levels. In this case 
whether individual`s (level 1) responses to the questions about economic redistribution varies 
based on the level of income inequality in the country where they live (level 2). The 
hypothesis, laid out in the theory section, is that low income earners will be more in favor of 
economic redistribution in countries where the level of income inequality is higher. High 
income earners, on the other hand, are hypothesized to be less in favor of redistribution in 
those countries. The same is true for people with lower and higher education levels. A multi- 
level OLS linear regression analysis is performed in order to test this4. 
 
4.2.1. Variables 
The dependent variables are the same as in the macro level regression analysis: 1) if incomes 
should be redistributed more equally, or if we need larger income differences as incentives, 
and; 2) if everyone should make sure they can provide for themselves, or if the government 
should make sure everyone is provided for. 
 
 
 
 4 It was not necessary to perform the same data diagnostic tests as in relation to the macro analysis, since only one 
independent variable is included at the individual level (income/education level) and one at the country level (gini 
coefficient) in the regression models. These are furthermore included in an interaction term in all models in the analysis. 
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Instead of using the average standard deviation on these questions, as I did in the macro 
analysis, I now use the standard version of the questions. That is, the degree to which my 
independent variables can predict the respondents´ answers to the questions. 
 
The EVS and WVS have regularly asked respondents to place themselves on an income scale 
from 1-10 in relation to the country that they live in. I have recoded this scale into three 
dummy variables, and in the presentation of the results I use the “middle income group” as my 
reference group. I have, however, also tested the results with the other two income groups as 
my reference groups, as well as with only two dummy variables, without getting any 
significant change in the results. Finally, the surveys asked the respondents´ about their 
education level. Those responsible for the WVS and EVS have recoded this variable into 
three values: low education, middle education and high education. These were then recoded 
into three dummy variables and middle education level is used as the reference category 
(WVS Longitudinal Data File, first released 2015-04-18; EVS Longitudinal Data file, 2015- 
10-30). 
 
Education and income level are the only individual level independent variables included in the 
analysis. A separate analysis was, however, conducted that included a number of control 
variables that, according to previous research, are important in predicting people´s attitudes to 
welfare and economic redistribution. These were: gender, age, trust, and if the respondent was 
employed in the public or private sector (Svallfors, 2013, p.375). Education and income was 
also included as control variables for each other in this analysis. The effects were in the same 
direction as the one without the controls, which is why they are not presented in the result 
section. One major difference in the analysis with the controls was that the interaction effects 
for income level and inequality was stronger for one of the dependent variables. If anything 
this strengthens the conclusions that will be presented in the result section: that there is not a 
greater differences between high and low income earners in more unequal countries. The 
results from the analysis with controls, together with a brief discussion on interpretation and 
coding of variables, can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Lastly, the only independent variable at the country level is the countries level of income 
inequality that is measured in the same was as in the macro analysis: the gini coefficient net 
of taxes and transfers. 
 
4.3. Cross-country analysis over time 
The longitudinal nature of the WVS and EVS data allows me to analyze the relationship in a 
dynamic framework over time. This is very useful, since it makes it possible to draw 
inferences about causality. It is also, if causality exists, possible to test the causal direction of 
the relationship. Causality might actually run from polarization towards income inequality and 
not only the other way around, which is something that other studies have alluded to. The data 
I have is heavily tilted towards cross country observations in comparison with time 
observations, i.e., T is much smaller than N. It is therefore necessary to use another analysis 
technique than cross-sectional-time-series analysis, which is otherwise the most commonly 
used one. 
 
I will therefore perform an OLS regression analysis based on the principles of granger 
causality. The principle of granger causality states that a variable X1 can be said to have a 
causal impact on another variable Y if the lagged change in X1 leads to a change in Y, even 
after controlling for the lagged change in Y itself (Granger, 1969; Bartels, 2013). I will 
modify this principle somewhat and test if changes in Y can be predicted by lagged changes 
in X1, even after controlling for lagged changes in Y and other relevant control variables Xn5 
The reason for using changes in Y is that it is a more accurate test of the causality of the 
relationship than only testing how well the independent variables predict the current value of 
Y. The data for my analysis covers 43 countries over a time span from 1989 to 2013, and the 
number of time observations per country various from 3-5 (see Appendix 3 for a list of the 
countries included in the analysis). 
 
 
 
 
 
5 See Bartels (2013) for a similar modification of the concept of Granger causality in his analysis of changes in political 
polarization in Europe. 
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A problem with my panel data is that it is very unbalanced. The reason for this is that I have 
tried to strike a balance between including as many observations as possible at the same time 
as I keep it reasonably balanced. First, the time gaps between the observations for each panel 
vary from 5-12 years. Most of the gaps lay in a more narrow range between these two 
extremes, but it is nonetheless a problematic amount of variation. Differences in time gaps 
can bias the results if it impacts it in a systematic way. It could, for example, be that countries 
where the effect of inequality is larger happen to have bigger time gaps. This might then 
inflate the results of the overall effect of income inequality. There are also variations when it 
comes to the number of time observations per panel (country): 3 countries have 5 time 
observations, 11 have 4 observations and 29 only 3 ones. The countries with more observation 
might therefore bias the results, since they have a bigger impact. There is also a risk of 
cross sectional chocks, like an international economic crisis, impacting the results in certain 
time periods. I try to correct for these problems by performing the same regression analysis as 
the one described above, but with a strongly balanced panel set instead. I do this as a form of 
robustness control to check if the results are approximately the same. In the strongly balances 
set all countries have only three same time observations: 1990/91, 1999/2000 and 
2008/2009. The number of countries then drops to 22, compared with 43 in the original 
analysis. The results from this “balanced” analysis reaffirm the ones from the standard one, 
thus strengthening the credibility of the results. I will only report the results from the original 
analysis in the result section below, but the regression table from the strongly balanced panel 
set, as well as a list of the countries included, can be found in the Appendix1and 3. 
 
Given these shortcomings, the results from the analysis should be interpreted with caution. 
Especially, the lack of time observations means that a more complete dataset over time could 
produce different results that would be more credible. The test conducted is also a tough one, 
since it can be hard to get significant results when one test how changes in a variable predict 
changes in another one: especially with so few time observations. There is a large degree of 
random variable in the observations that it is hard to capture with predictor variables. The 
results should therefore be viewed as indicators, rather than firm evidence. 
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I performed the same data diagnostic tests as has been described in relation to the other 
analysis. A typical problem with panel level data is that it adds another dimension of possible 
autocorrelation within panels over time. It is common that error terms in one time period 
are correlated with error terms in future time periods. This might then lead to over or 
underestimation of the variance in the regression model (R2), thus leading one to falsely 
accept or reject the null hypothesis (Durbin & Watson, 1950, pp.409-411). I test for 
autocorrelation by performing the Durbin Watson test and the regression models for both of 
my dependent variables are fairly close  to  a  score  of  2,  which  indicates  no 
autocorrelation. It is problematic to perform a Durbin-Watson test when one has a lagged 
dependent variable in the model. The fact that I control for the lagged change in my dependent 
variable is, however, also a way of correcting for any possible estimation bias caused by 
autocorrelation (Keele & Kelly, 2005). It should therefore not be any serious problem caused 
by autocorrelation in the analysis. The other diagnostic tests also show that the data do not 
seem to be in violation of any of the core assumptions6. 
4.3.1. Variables 
The dependent variables are the same in the panel data analysis as the ones previously 
described in relation to the macro and micro analysis. That is, the countries average standard 
deviation to the two questions about economic redistribution. The difference is that I here use 
changes in the standard deviations between two waves. It needs to be noted that a number of 
countries did not answer the question about whether income inequality should be made more 
equal in the EVS wave 1999. This altered which waves I choose to include for these countries, 
which normally was done by randomly taking the years they were included in the surveys in 
a 5-12 year interval. I choose to include observations within this interval since income 
inequality tends to change slowly and it would therefore be misleading to use shorter time 
periods. 
 
 
6 The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticy both showed that this firmly could be rejected with chi2 values of2.62 and 
0.63 for the dependent variables. The VIF-values were 1.04 and tolarence values .96, which show that there clearly were no 
problems with multicollinearity. The Durbin-Watson scores were 1.84 and 2.26. That is, close to 2 indicating no serial auto- 
correlation. It is not surprising that all of these values were low, given how low the correlation between changes in income 
inequality and changes in polarization turned out to be. The range for DF-beta values were between 0.18-and -.03, and the 
highest leverage value was 0.11, so there were clearly not any problems with outliers. 
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The choice of countries was otherwise completely random, since I include all countries that 
took part of the surveys at least three times and that had gaps in their observations of 5-12 
years. 
 
The main independent variable is the change in the gini coefficient for a country between the 
two waves preceding the waves making up the dependent variable. The data comes from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database and measures the gini coefficient after taxes 
and transfers (Solt, 2014). The control variables I tested for were: changes in GDP per capita 
adjusted for purchasing power parity; changes in average year of schooling; changes in 
ideology; changes in party system ideology, and; party system polarization. The data and 
measurement techniques for all of these were the same as has been described in relation to the 
macro and micro level analysis. The only difference is that I measure the lagged changes of 
theses variables as well. Party system polarization was constructed by taking the average 
standard deviation for the parties placement on the Comparative Party Manifesto`s left/right 
ideological scale, for each country. 
 
The UNDP only provides data for average years of schooling in 1980, 85, 90, 2000, 2005, and 
annually after that. Countries who did not answer the survey in these years got the UNDP 
measure that was closest to the year they answered the survey. They got the average of two 
UNDP schooling scores if they answered the survey in a year that lay between two of these 
time periods: for example, 1995. A few of the variables for GDP per capita in purchasing 
power parity, which were not available via the QoG dataset, was retrieved from the website 
tradingeconomics.com (2016). As it turned out none of the control variables altered the effect 
of income inequality, which was highly insignificant in all cases. I will therefore not include 
the models with these control variables in the presentation of the results. The regression 
analysis with all the control variables included is presented in Appendix1. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Macro level OLS multiple regression analysis 
The graphs below depict the correlation between income inequality and polarization in 
attitudes to economic redistribution. The graph to the left shows the relationship for all of the 
74 countries that are part of the regression analysis and the one to the right for only 21 
“traditional western democracies”. The data are for the last year the countries were part of the 
EVS or WVS during the period 2006-2013. The dependent variable in the graphs is the 
average standard deviation for both of the questions about economic redistribution averaged 
up together. 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between income inequality and average standard deviation (polarization) 
 
 
 
 
Sources: EVS Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database, version 5.0, October2014. 
 
 
I choose to include the graph for western democracies to show that the relationship is strong 
both for the sample at large and for this relevant subgroup. Western democracies have the best 
and most reliable data on the variables used in the study, and have been better studied by 
previous research on political polarization and income inequality. They also share a common 
history, culture and socio-economic structure that make it interesting to zoom in on them. The 
correlations are very strong for both the entire sample (r = .45) and for only western 
democracies (r = .49). The fact that income inequality and polarization in attitudes to 
economic redistribution  correlate  to  such  a  degree  is  interesting 
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and something that has not been studied in any deeper detail before.7 It runs contrary to 
research on ideological sorting, which has shown that there is a negative correlation between 
ideological polarization and income inequality among western democracies, i.e. more equal 
countries have populations that are more ideologically polarized (Iversen and Soskice,2015). 
 
The graphs below show the same relationship, but for a period of 17 years instead: 1996- 
2013. The variable for polarization is calculated by taking the average standard deviation to 
the two questions about redistribution for every year the countries were included in the 
surveys. The mean of these two values taken together is then correlated against the average 
gini coefficient for the years the countries were part of the survey. The graph to the left 
shows the relationship for the entire sample (74 countries) and the one to the right for 21 
“traditional western democracies”: 
Figure 5. Correlation between income inequality and standard deviation (polarization) 1996-2013 
 
 
 
Note: The values for the average standard deviation and gini coefficient are taken by averaging the values from all the 
years the countries were included in the surveys 1996-2013. The dependent variable (polarization) is the average 
standard deviation to both questions about redistribution taken together. Sources: EVS Longitudinal Data File; WVS 
Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality Database, version 5.0, October 2014. 
 
The correlation when one takes the averages of the standard deviation to the questions1996- 
2013 is extremely high: 0.66 for the entire sample and 0.64 for traditional western 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
The exceptions Ihave found to this are Graechner (2016) that found a connection between income inequality and polarization in attitudes 
to economic redistribution, using the same survey questions as I do. Another one is Östling and Lindqvist (2010) who found a correlation 
between income inequality and polarization in attitudes to redistribution in their study of relationship between polarization and the size of 
governments. 
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democracies. This shows that the relationship is not due to some statistical coincident, since it 
is robust throughout the time that the questions have been asked in the surveys. The reason as 
to why this relationship is stronger than the one for only the last year is probably because 
polarization tends to fluctuate quite a bit from year to year. Bartels (2013) finds that increases 
in how polarized voters are on policy issues tend to be followed by subsequent decreases 
during the next survey waves. This could, for example, be due to regression towards the mean 
or some other unexplained factor (Kahneman, 2012). That being said, there is still a rather 
strong and statistically significant relationship, when only the last year is included. The 
regression analysis is therefore performed with data from the countries last survey year only. 
 
Table 4. OLS cross country regression analysis of the relationship between income inequality and polarization 
(average standard deviation) in attitudes to economic redistribution 
Variables Std. Incomes more equal Std. Government make sure everyone is provided  for 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Gini .016*** 
(0.00) 
.012 
(0.00) 
.019** 
(0.01) 
.022** 
(0.01) 
.015 
(0.01) 
.019*** 
(0.00) 
.013* 
(0.00) 
.018** 
(0.01) 
.024*** 
(0.01) 
.015 
(0.01) 
Log GDP  -.066 
(0.04) 
-.139* 
(0.06) 
-.111 
(0.06) 
-.11 
(0.14) 
 -.094* 
(0.04) 
-.167** 
(0.06) 
-.146* 
(0.06) 
.153 
(0.13) 
Years of 
Schooling 
  .029 
(0.02) 
.021 
(0.02) 
   .035 
(0.02) 
.039 
(0.02) 
 
Gov. Exp.   .008 
(0.00) 
    .004 .004  
Fractionalization 
of Parliament 
   .020 
(0.23) 
    .238 
(0.23) 
 
Unionization     .001 
(0.00) 
    .000 
(0.00) 
Gov. Social 
Expenditures 
    -.001 
(0.01) 
    -.002 
(0.01) 
Adjusted R2 .14 .16 .19 .22 .04 .18 .23 .24 .28 .12 
Intercept 2.12 
(0.16) 
2.92 
(0.53) 
2.81 
(0.55) 
2.59 
(0.58) 
3.20 
(1.56) 
1.20 
(0.17) 
3.13 
(0.53) 
3.17 
(0.56) 
2.57 
(0.59) 
3.59 
(1.44) 
N 74 73 73 67 33 74 73 73 67 33 
Note: significance values: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. *** p ≤ 0.001; Standard errors in parenthesis: Sources; EVS 
Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database, version 5.0, October 2014; QoG Standard Time-Series Database (Teorell, et al., 2016); UNDP (2015); 
OECD union density statistics; Hayter & Stoevska (2011); Tradingeconomics.com 
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Model 1 and 6 shows that inequality, on its own, has a significant predictive capacity for both 
variables of polarization. The unstandardized regression coefficients are .016 and .019 and are 
both statistically significant at the highest level. An increase in the gini coefficient (which is 
measured on a scale from 1-100) of 10 is associated with having a .16 and .19 higher standard 
deviation on the questions. Another way of illustrating this is through an example: Sweden 
had a gini coefficient of 23.91 in 2011, which is the lowest of all the countries in the sample. 
South Africa, on the other hand, had the highest gini coefficient of all countries at 60.29. 
Moving from Sweden´s level of inequality to South Africa´s is associated with a 0.58 or 0.69 
increase in standard deviation according to the results from the analysis. This would move 
Sweden from being part of the one third of countries with the lowest level of polarization to 
the one third with the highest. Another example of the difference in dispersion of views that 
this change entails can be given by the two histograms shown below. They show the 
distribution of answers to one of the question about economic redistribution in South Africa 
and Sweden. The difference in average standard deviation between the respondents from 
the countries was 0.66: 
 
Figure. 6. Histogram of the frequencies of responses in Sweden to the right and South Africa to the left to the 
statement about “whether incomes should be made more equal or not?” 
 
 
 
Source: WVS Longitudinal Data File; EVS Longitudinal Data File 
 
 
The graphs clearly show that a difference of .66 in standard deviation constitutes a more 
polarized distribution of views. The graph over South Africa’s frequencies to the left have many 
more people answering at the extremes and much fewer close to the mean. 
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In model 2 and 8 GDP per capita in purchasing power is included alongside the gini 
coefficient. It shows that a higher level of economic development is associated with lower 
polarization. This is also evident from the graphs of the scatter plots, but it is true even when 
one holds the level of income inequality constant. The effect of income inequality is reduced 
by including the country`s level of GDP, but only marginally and it stays significant. That 
richer countries are considerably less polarized in their attitudes to these policy issues is an 
interesting finding and it begs the question of whether this is true of other policy issues as 
well? It must, however, be noted that the effect of GDP in model 2 does not reach statistically 
significance, but the general conclusion from all models taken together is that GDP is 
associated with lower polarization. 
 
The other control variables have no significant impact on polarization and do not impact the 
coefficient for income inequality in any significant manner. This actually contradicts the 
theoretical framework laid out in the theory section. I had expected that the variables 
measuring left/right political culture (government expenditures, social expenditures and union 
density) and average years of schooling should have an effect on polarization. That is, that 
they would both impact polarization in a significant way and reduce (mediate) the effect of 
income inequality. 
 
The effect of income inequality loses significance in model 5 and 10 when government social 
expenditures and union density is included. The only countries included in the analysis of this 
model were OECD-countries, since those were the only ones with reliable data on social 
expenditures (33 countries). The reason for this drop in significance is, however, most likely 
due to the fact that the number of observations is lower. I control for this by conducting the 
same step-wise analysis as above, but with only OECD-countries instead of the entire sample. 
This showed that unionization and social expenditures did not alter the size of the regression 
coefficient for inequality, which only became insignificant after the inclusion of GDP. The 
results form models 5 and 10 does, however, provide reasons for caution about the degree to 
which the results can be generalized to subsets of countries, as well as the general strength of 
the relationship. 
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In sum, the cross country analysis provides strong support for a relationship between income 
inequality and polarization in attitudes to redistribution across countries. Somewhat 
surprisingly, it does not provide support for two of the proposed explanatory variables in the 
theory section: educational opportunities and left political culture. The next part of the paper 
examines another one of the explanatory variables laid out in the theoretical framework: that 
people with higher/lower income level will hold more divergent views in more unequal 
countries (the income effect). The same test is also performed for people with higher/lower 
education level. 
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5.2. Micro Analysis 
The table below presents the results from the multilevel analysis, which tests if income 
inequality at the country level impacts the answers of people with a high or low 
income/education level. 
 
Table. 5. Multilevel regression analysis. Dependent variable: attitudes to redistribution. 
Variables  Incomes more  equal   Government make sure everyone is provided for 
1  2 3 4  5 6 7   8 
Fixed Intercept 5.53*** 
(0.12) 
4.87*** 
(0.53) 
4.81** 
(0.54) 
5.02*** 
(0.53) 
5.78*** 
(0.12) 
4.77*** 
(0.51) 
4.40*** 
(0.53) 
4.22*** 
(0.53) 
Country level 
varible 
Gini  .017 
(0.01) 
.020 
(0.01) 
  043** 
(0.01) 
.038* 
(0.01) 
044** 
(0.01) 
Individual level 
variables 
Middle income 
Low income  -.317*** 
(0.01) 
 -.565*** 
(0.08) 
 .391*** 
(0.02) 
 .660*** 
(0.08) 
High income  .666*** 
(0.08) 
 .409*** 
(0.02) 
 -.231*** 
(0.08) 
 -.371*** 
(0.02) 
High income*gini  -.007 
(0.00) 
   -.004 
(0.00) 
  
Low income*gini    .007*** 
(0.00) 
   -.007*** 
(0.00) 
Middle education 
Low education   -.291*** 
(0.02) 
   .287*** 
(0.02) 
 
High education   .423*** 
(0.09) 
   -.337*** 
(0.02) 
 
High 
education*gini 
  -.004 
(0.00) 
   .003 
(0.00) 
 
Std. countrylevel 1.01 
(0.08) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
1.02 
(0.08) 
1.00 
(0.08) 
1.07 
(0.09) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(0.08) 
Std. individual 
level 
2.72 
(0.01) 
2.70 
(0.01) 
2.69 
(0.01) 
2.70 
(0.01) 
2.69 
(0.01) 
2.68 
(0.01) 
2.68 
(0.01) 
2.68 
(0.01) 
-Log likelihood -267846 -267306 -251707 267306 -268835 -268226 -253014 -268222 
Observations 110 675 110 675 104 356 110 675 111 449 111 499 105 142 111 4999 
Countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Note: significance values: * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. *** p ≤ 0.001; Standard errors in parenthesis: Sources; EVS 
Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database, version 5.0, October 2014. 
First off, the empty column in model 1 and 5 shows that the data is suitable for a multi-level 
analysis since a substantial share of the variance in in people´s responses can be explained at the 
(second) country level.1 
 
 
1 
Hong Kong was included in this multilevel analysis (making the sample 75), but not in the macro analysis presented before. The country answered the survey 
in 2005, which was below the cut-off for the macro analysis. The answering options to the questions about redistribution also appear to have been fewer 
than in the other countries, which could affect Hong Kong´s average deviation compared to the others. 
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The intra class correlation is a measure for the share of the variance in respondents´ answers 
that can be explained at the country (second) level (Fields, 2009, pp.728-729). This was 
calculated through the estat icc command in stata and were 0.12 and 0.14 for the two 
dependent variables. This means that 12 and 14 percent of the differences between 
respondents’ answers can be explained at the country level (ibid). 
 
The results reported in model 2 and 3 shows the effect of self-reported income and education 
level on respondents´ answer to the two questions. As expected high income earners were 
considerably more likely to agree with statement 10 that “we need greater differences as an 
incentive” than with statement 1 that “incomes should be made more equal”. The effect is 
strong with an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.666, which means that they were 
predicted to answer 0.666 scale steps (on a 1-10 scale) higher than those belonging to the 
middle-income group, which works as the reference category. Respondents from the low- 
income group, on the other hand, were predicted to answer 0.229 scale steps closer to option 1 
“that incomes should be made more equal” than the middle-income group. The effect of 
education, presented in model 3, is also strong and in the same direction as that of income. 
Those who had a higher education answered 0.423 scale-steps higher than those with a lower 
education. 
 
The question about the government´s role in redistribution incomes is ordered in the opposite 
direction as the first one about whether incomes should be made more equal or not. That is, a 
higher value indicates answering closer to option 10 “that the government should make sure 
that everyone is provided for” than 1 that “it is everyone’s personal responsibility to make 
sure that he is provided for”. The results are in the same direction as the ones for the other 
dependent variable: respondents with lower education/income were more positive towards 
redistribution and those with higher education/income saw it more as a personal responsibility 
(model 6, 7 and 8). All of these regression coefficients, except for the gini coefficient at the 
country level, were strong and statistically significant at the highest level. 
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The results are in line with hypothesized effect of income and educational differences laid out 
in the theoretical framework. Having a higher income and education level should indicate that 
one has more to lose from redistribution and that it is therefore rational to be more critical of 
redistribution. The surprising part of the multilevel analysis is, however, that the level of 
inequality at the country level does not moderate the effect of income and education level in 
the theorized direction. Respondents with a higher education or income, living in more 
unequal countries, were not more against redistribution than their counterparts from more 
egalitarian countries: the interaction effects presented in models 2, 3, 6 and 7. The same was 
true for those with a low income, whose answers did not differ depending on the level of 
inequality: models 4 and 8. The interaction terms, although sometimes significant, all have a 
very small effect and they are in the opposite direction than what was hypothesized by the 
“income effect” in the theory section, i.e., different income groups are less polarized in more 
unequal countries. 
 
This goes against both the explanation given by the theory (the income effect) and most of the 
previous literature (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). That is, that a higher level of income inequality 
implies that the mean income is further away from the income of lower income earners, which 
should lead them to favor redistribution more. The opposite should also be true for high 
income earners. The question is therefore why more unequal countries are more polarized, if it 
is not due to greater attitudinal differences between those with high/low income/education 
levels? One possible explanation for this is that people in countries with higher inequality 
have more varying opinions throughout the income scale. This is indeed what I find, as is 
illustrated by the table below. The table depicts the results from a regression analysis where 
the average standard deviation for the three different income groups works as the dependent 
variable and the gini coefficient as the independent one. It is the same analysis as the one 
presented previously in the macro analysis section, but with the three income groups analyzed 
separately instead of together as one. The results show that higher income inequality is 
associated with greater differences within each income group. This is illustrated both with the 
positive regression coefficients and the relatively high correlations. 
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Table 6. Regression coefficients and correlations for income inequality (independent variable) and the average 
  standard deviation (dependent variable) for specific income groups   
 
Incomes more equal Government make sure everyone is  provided for 
Regression coefficients 
 
Low income earners 
 
.020*** 
(0.00) 
 
.017** 
(0.01) 
 
Middle income earners 
 
.016*** 
(0.00) 
 
.017** 
(0.00) 
 
High income earners 
 
0.016** 
(0.00) 
 
.023*** 
(0.02) 
 
Correlations 
 
Low income earners 
 
.44 
 
.20 
 
Middle income earners 
 
.37 
 
.21 
 
High income earners 
 
.36 
 
.42 
Note: significance values: * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. *** p ≤ 0.001; Standard errors in parenthesis: Sources; World 
Value Survey – Longitudinal Data File; European Value Study – Longitudinal Data  file;  Standardized  World 
Income Inequality Database: Standard errors in prentices. 
 
 
One possible explanation for this general dispersion of polarization throughout the income 
scales is the political culture explanation described in the theory section. A country where a 
certain level of government intervention and redistribution is an integrated part of the country 
might also have more of common understanding on these issues. One example of this is the 
Scandinavian countries where a strong universal welfare state is typically accepted as part of 
the economic “model” of the country. This is more or less true of most European countries, 
which probably is part of the explanation for their lower level of polarization. People from 
countries where government redistribution is less advanced will find it harder to know what 
the appropriate level of redistribution ought to be. They might therefore give answers that 
deviate more to the extremes than in countries where people are more used to a certain level 
of redistribution. 
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The results from the macro level analysis, however, contradict this “left political culture” 
explanation. The effect of income inequality was not reduced (mediated) by bringing in 
variables for government expenditure, social expenditures and union density into the analysis. 
This could, however, be due to the difficulty of measuring left/right political culture and 
welfare generosity: especially for the entire sample, where the operationalization used was 
total public expenditures. Future studies that analysis the left political culture explanation in a 
more detailed and advanced way is needed in order to better test this explanation. 
 
Another possible explanation in line with the “educational effect” part of the theory is that 
more unequal countries have greater differences in education level and that this accounts for 
some of the differences in polarization. Educational differences, as measured by the average 
standard deviation to the question about education level, do correlate positively with income 
inequality and polarization. The effect is, however, too small to be part of the explanation for 
the correlation between inequality and polarization. 
 
In sum, the results do not provide support for the theory that inequality leads to greater 
polarization by increasing differences in attitudes between people with high and low 
income/education levels. Instead, inequality seems to be associated with greater differences 
throughout the income distribution (within each income group). 
44  
 
 
5.3. Time series analysis 
This table below presents the results from an OLS linear regression analysis, with lagged 
changes in income inequality as the independent variable and changes in polarization as the 
dependent one. Also included are lagged changes in polarization as a control variable and a 
model that illustrates how changes in inequality and polarization correlate with each other 
during the same time periods. 
 
Table 7. OLS linear cross country regression analysis of lagged changes in income inequality and changes in 
  polarization (average standard deviation)   
 
Variables Std.  Incomes more equal   ∆  t-1 Std. Government make sure everyone is provided for ∆  t-1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Gini ∆ t-2 -.001 (0.01)  .007 (0.01)  -.002 (0.01)  -.005 (0.01)  
Y  ∆ t-2  -.379** (0.13) -.393** (0.14)   -.251 (0.13) -.260* (0.13)  
Gini ∆ t-1    .022* (0.01)    .006 (0.01) 
Adjusted R2 -.02 .11 .10 .03 -.02 .05 .03 -.00 
Intercept -.064 
(0.05) 
-.050 
(0.04) 
-.063 
(0.05) 
-.054 
(0.03) 
-.066 
(0.04) 
-.083* 
(0.03) 
-.074 
(0.04) 
-.081 
(0.03) 
N 56 56 56 95 60 60 60 103 
Note: significance values: * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. *** p ≤ 0.001; Standard errors in parenthesis: Sources; EVS 
Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database, version 5.0, October 2014. 
 
 
The analysis show that changes in income inequality has not had any effect on subsequent 
changes in polarization. An increase in income inequality between two waves is associated 
with a small and statistically insignificant decrease in polarization. The coefficient of -.001 in 
model 1 and -.002 in model 5 indicates that an increase in the gini coefficient of 1 is 
associated with a .001 and .002 decrease in standard deviation between the following two 
waves. Model 2 and 6 show that lagged changes in standard deviation has a strong and 
significant effect on change in the standard deviation between the following two waves. An 
increase in the average standard deviation of 1 is associated with a subsequent decrease of 
0.392 and 0.251 between the following two waves. This is in line with the findings from 
Bartels (2013) that polarization in mass attitudes fluctuates up and down over time. Model 3 
and 7 are the main models where I include the lagged value of changes in Y as a control 
variable. The results are in the same direction as the previous ones with no significant effect 
of changes in income inequality and a strong and significant effect from lagged changes in Y. 
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The last two models (4 and 8) show the correlation between changes in income inequality and 
polarization during the same time periods. They correlate positively with one another and 
model 4 has a significant effect for the correlation. This, however, does not say anything 
about causality and an increase in inequality is, as has just been mentioned, associated with a 
decrease in polarization between the next two waves (model 1 and 5). The correlation 
between income inequality and polarization is, furthermore, very weak and significant for 
only one of the dependent variables (model 4). 
Figure. 7. Average changes for all countries in gini coefficient and standard deviation to the question about whether 
incomes should be made more equal 
 
 
Sources: EVS Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database, version 5.0, October2014. 
46  
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Average changes for all countries in gini coefficient and standard deviation to the question about whether the 
government should make sure everyone is provided for 
 
Sources: EVS Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database, version 5.0, October2014. 
 
The graphs above depict the average change in gini coefficient and polarization for all of the 
countries that were included in the WVS or EVS in three different time periods: 1989-1994, 
1999-2004 and 2005-2009. It is in other words the average polarization and income inequality 
for all countries during these three ways. Income inequality has increased steadily and 
significantly (the red lines) whereas polarization was lower in the last time period than the 
first one for both of the questions (blue lines). There is, in other words, no correlation 
between changes in income inequality and polarization for all of the countries taken together. 
 
In conclusion, the results from the analysis over time provides rather compelling evidence that 
changes income inequality does not seem to have had an impact on polarization in attitudes 
about economic redistribution. Analysis with only the first and last year the countries 
responded to the survey, as well as with the more balanced dataset, was in the same direction, 
further strengthening the credibility of the results. 
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6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
An important contribution with this study is that it provides convincing empirical evidence for 
a positive correlation between income inequality and polarization in attitudes to economic 
redistribution at the country level. This relationship stays significant, even with the inclusion 
of relevant control variables. Furthermore, the results indicate that the relationship holds for a 
large sample of countries (74) as well as for relevant subgroups within this sample: although it 
is less significant for some subgroups (for example, OECD-countries). This runs contrary to 
some of the previous research, which has argued that countries with lower income inequality 
tend to have population`s that are more ideologically polarized (Iversen & Soskice, 2015). It 
reaffirms the arguments made by Fiorina (2008) in relation to the American case: that a 
country’s level of polarization depends on how one measures it. 
 
The results go against the theorized explanations given by this study, as well as previous 
research (Meltzer & Richards, 1987; Pontusson & Rueda, 2010, Finseraas, Barth & Moene, 
2015). These studies have focused on party system polarization, but an important part of their 
theoretical motivation for a positive relationship between inequality and polarization is greater 
differences in attitudes to redistribution between low and high income earners. The multilevel 
analysis performed in this study showed that this was in fact not the case: there were not 
greater differences between income groups in more unequal countries. Instead, the results 
indicate that attitudinal differences are greater within all income/education groups in more 
unequal countries. Future studies might therefore need to nuance their description of how 
different population groups react to increased income inequality. 
 
An interesting task for future studies would be to try to find an explanation as to why 
attitudinal differences are greater within each income group and not between them. The 
political left culture explanation, given in the theory section, does seem to fit with this type of 
dispersion of views. Being accustomed to a more comprehensive welfare state could lead 
people throughout the income distribution to develop more of a common understanding of the 
appropriate level of distribution. 
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Countries with a “left culture” also tend to have stronger left (worker) and right (bourgeoisie) 
parties, which could contribute to more similar attitudes within the income groups. The reason 
for this is that the parties provide information ques to their supporters about how to think on 
issues like economic redistribution. Part of a future study could therefore be to test the 
“political left” culture theory in a more systematic way and with a better operationalization of 
the variables than public sectors expenditures as a share of GDP. 
 
Finally, changes in income inequality do not seem to lead to changes in polarization in 
attitudes to economic redistribution. These results are in line with other studies on mass 
polarization (as measured by standard deviation) in attitudes to policy issues, which have 
shown a pattern of stability or depolarization over time (Adams, De Vries & Leither, 2012; 
Adams, Green & Milazzo, 2012; Bartels, 2013; Neusser, Johnston & Bodet, 2014). It is, 
however, important to caution against any strong conclusions on this point. To test whether 
changes in income inequality leads to changes in polarization is definitely a hard test. It is 
also problematic that the data set is unbalanced and, most of all, that it only covers a very 
limited number of time periods. Future studies could remedy many of these problems by using 
panel data that covers more time periods. One way of doing this may be to scale down on the 
number of countries in the sample, in order to get more time observations for each country. 
 
Another interesting avenue for future research is to test the effect that income inequality has 
on other economic policy issues than economic redistribution. The results from a study by 
Grechina (2016), for example, indicate that inequality does correlate with other economic 
policy questions as well. The possible political implications could obviously be greater if the 
correlation stretched to a broader set of questions, and there might also be a stronger case for a 
causal relationship. 
 
The results from this study point towards a number of possible political implications. The 
most obvious of these is that the relationship between income inequality and polarization 
could make it harder to push through effective redistributive policies. Previous research has 
shown that political polarization hinders forceful political initiatives since compromises 
become harder. 
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Having greater differences of opinion within the various income groups might therefore make 
it less likely that effective popular movements get created that otherwise could push for 
redistributive reforms. It will also be more difficult for popular opinion to affect decision 
makers if it is divided in various camps. Popular opinions tend to have a big effect on actual 
policies when there is broad understanding on an issue, thus facilitating compromise between 
political parties. Scholars have also argued that mass polarization can lead to increased 
polarization within the part system, as the parties adjust their policies to their core 
constituents. All of this, taken together, could help explain why some countries have been less 
effective in implementing reforms that reduces income inequality. On the other hand, it does 
not seem as though an increase in income inequality exacerbates this problem, since I find no 
effect of changes over time. 
 
Besides this, it is important to reflect on how polarization in attitudes to redistribution is 
connected with other policy issues. Questions about redistribution and welfare is, as has been 
mentioned, an important question in politics. It lies at the heart of how a lot of parties and 
people characterize themselves politically: as “left” or “right”. A connection between income 
inequality and polarization in attitudes to redistribution might therefore help explain 
differences in how polarized countries are in general. This could then be part of the 
explanation for greater tensions and conflicts in some countries. There are, in fact, numerous 
examples of countries that have broken down into heavy internal conflicts over questions 
about redistribution and the appropriate level of government involvement in the economy 
(Valenzuela, 1978; Dalton, 2008, p.900). It is important to point out that the result from this 
study does not provide any evidence of this relationship between inequality and polarization 
on the one hand, and polarization and internal conflict on the other hand. It is just worth 
reflecting over, since previous research has argued for this connection between polarization 
and conflict. There are also some uncertainties regarding just how substantial the results found 
in these studies are and especially how, and if, they impact other socio-political factors. 
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Future studies should be directed towards testing what the possible effects from a more 
polarized distribution of views on policy issues could be. Very few previous studies have 
done on this, which means that there is a big gap in the literature.8 
 
Finally, this study provides methodological insights for studies about mass attitudinal 
polarization more broadly and not just in relation to income inequality. It has become 
increasingly common with statements about how the population in countries like Sweden is 
becoming more polarized. Annual surveys from countries like Sweden provide interesting 
data to study attitudinal polarization over time and the individual and contextual factors that 
are important in explaining differences between people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 An exception is Lindqvist & Östling (2010). 
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Appendix 1 
The table below presents the results from the strongly balanced time series analysis. That is, 
for 22 countries who answered the survey 1990/91, 1999/2000 and 2008/2009. These 
countries were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Great Britain. 
 
Table 8. OLS regression analysis with strongly balanced time series dataset. Dependent variable: average standard 
  deviation(polarization)   
 
Variables Incomes more equal   ∆ t-1 Government make sure  everyone is provided for ∆  t-1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Gini ∆ t-2 -.007 (0.01)  -.008 (0.02)  -.006 (0.01)  -.008 (0.01)  
Y  ∆ t-2  -.290* (0.14) -.274 (0.15)   -.182 (0.13) -186 (0.13)  
Gini ∆ t-1    .026* (0.01)    -001 (0.01) 
Intercept -.064 
(0.06) 
-.059 
(0.04) 
-.054 
(0.05) 
-.068 
(0.04) 
-.039 
(0.04) 
-.063 
(0.04) 
-.042 
(0.04) 
-.073 
(0.03) 
Adjusted R2 -.02 .08 .06 .06 -.02 .02 .01 -.01 
N 38 37 37 75 40 39 39 79 
Notes: significance values: * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. *** p ≤ 0.001; Standard errors in parenthesis: Sources: Sources; 
EVS Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database, version 5.0, October 2014. 
 
 
The next table presents the results from the standard time series analysis presented in the 
result section, but with all the control variables included. These were all discussed in the 
methods section and include changes between the two waves preceding the dependent 
variables in: log GDP, average years of schooling, party system ideology and party system 
polarization. 
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  Table 9. Time series OLS regression analysis, with full set of control variables   
 
Variables Incomes more equal   ∆ t-1 Government make sure everyone is provided for ∆ t-1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Gini ∆ t-2 .002 (0.02) -.005 (0.02) .005 (0.02) .004 (0.01) -.018 (0.02) -.018 (0.02) -.008 (0.01) -.005 (0.01) 
Y ∆ t-2 -.514** (0.18) -.539** (0.17) -.395** (0.14) -.399** (0.14) -.354 (0.17) -.350 (0.18) -.246 (0.13) -.275* (0.13) 
Party System 
Polarization 
∆ t-2 .033 (0.03)    -.010 (0.02)    
   Ideology ∆ 
t-2 
 -.044 
(0.02) 
   -.017 
(0.02) 
  
Log GDP ∆ t-2   .249 (0.24)    .095 (0.20)  
Average 
Years of 
Schooling     
 
   .005 
(0.07) 
   -.020 
(0.05) 
Intercept .001 
(0.06) 
.005 
(0.06) 
 -.045 
(0.07) 
-.030 
(0.05) 
-.018 
(0.05) 
-.087 
(0.05) 
-.046 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
Adjusted R2 .16 .21 .10 .09 .05 .06 .02 .02 
N 35 35 55 53 39 39 59 57 
Notes: significance values: * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. *** p ≤ 0.001; Standard errors in parenthesis: Sources: Sources; 
EVS Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database, version 5.0, October 2014; Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Matthie, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / regeln, Sven 
med Werner, Annika (2016): Manifestet Datainsamling. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version2016a. 
Berlin: Berlin Science Centrum för socialvetenskaplig (WZB) 
 
The table illustrates what was stated in the paper: including control variables did not change 
the effect that changes in income inequality had on changes in polarization. Income inequality 
remains highly insignificant when control variables that have been described as relevant in the 
theory section and previous research are included. The table shows the results when the 
variables are included separately together with the main dependent and independent variables. 
The same is true when multiple control variables are added together with the main variables, 
although this is not illustrated here. 
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Appendix 2 
A separate multilevel OLS linear regression analysis was conducted, which included 4 control 
variables that have been described as important predictors for peoples` attitudes to economic 
redistribution. These were: social trust, age, gender and if the respondent was employed in the 
private or public sector. All of the variables were retrieved from the EVS and WVS. The 
question that measured social trust consisted of two answering options: if the respondent felt 
that people in general could be trusted, or that you can never be too careful. This was recoded 
into two dummy variables, where those with low trust were the reference category. Age was 
measured on an 8-point scale, which was kept in its original form. Gender was of course 
dummy coded into two dummy variables for male and female (male = reference category). 
Finally, the variable for employment status was dummy coded into two dummy variables 
for those employed in the private and public sector respectively (private sector = reference 
category). The table on the next page depicts the results from the analysis.  The results 
reaffirm the ones from the multilevel analysis without controls: unequal countries do not have 
greater differences in attitudes amongst the income/education groups. If anything, the 
interaction effects between income and the gini coefficient in model 1 and 2 show the 
opposite effects: high income earners are more favorable towards redistribution when 
inequality is higher and the opposite for low income earners. The effect in this interaction 
term are slightly higher than without the controls, but overall they are very similar and 
definitely in the same direction, i.e., reaffirming each other. 
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Table 10. Multilevel OLS regression analysis with full set of controls and interactions. Dependent variable: attitudes 
to redistribution 
Variables  Income more equal   Government make sure everyone is provided for 
1  2 3 4  5 6 7   8 
Gini .023 
(0.02) 
.016 
(0.02) 
.021 
(0.02) 
.018 
(0.02) 
.044** 
(0.02) 
.045** 
(0.02) 
.044** 
(0.02) 
.042** 
(0.02) 
Middle 
income 
Low income -.244*** 
(0.02) 
-649*** 
(0.09) 
-242*** 
(0.02) 
-.241*** 
(0.02) 
.351*** 
(0.02) 
.644*** 
(0.09) 
.351*** 
(0.02) 
.351*** 
(0.02) 
High income .736*** 
(0.09) 
.345*** 
(0.02) 
.342*** 
(0.02) 
.342*** 
(0.02) 
-.208* 
(0.09) 
-.305*** 
(0.02) 
-.302*** 
(0.02) 
-.302*** 
(0.02) 
Age -.009 
(0.02) 
-.009 
(0.01) 
-.010 
(0.01) 
-.010 
(0.01) 
-.014* 
(0.01) 
-.015** 
(0.01) 
-.015** 
(0.01) 
-.014* 
(0.01) 
Middle 
education 
Low 
education 
-.195 
(0.02) 
-.195*** 
(0.02) 
-.195*** 
(0.02) 
-.350*** 
(0.10) 
.198*** 
(0.02) 
.199*** 
(0.02) 
.309*** 
(0.10) 
.199*** 
(0.02) 
High 
education 
.197*** 
(0.02) 
.199*** 
(0.02) 
.445*** 
(0.10) 
.199*** 
(0.02) 
-.126*** 
(0.02) 
-.124*** 
(0.02) 
-.124*** 
(0.02) 
-.252** 
(0.10) 
High 
income*gini 
-.011*** 
(0.00) 
   -.003 
(0.00) 
   
Low 
income*gini 
 .012*** 
(0.00) 
   -.008*** 
(0.00) 
  
High 
education*gini 
  -.007* 
(0.00) 
    .004 
(0.00) 
Low 
education*gini 
   .004 
(0.00) 
  -.003 
(0.00) 
 
Female -.099*** 
(0.02) 
-.099*** 
(0.02) 
.101*** 
(0.02) 
-.100*** 
(0.02) 
.161*** 
(0.02) 
.160*** 
(0.02) 
.161*** 
(0.02) 
.161*** 
(0.02) 
High trust -.060** 
(0.02) 
-.059** 
(0.02) 
-.060** 
(0.02) 
-.059** 
(0.02) 
-.103*** 
(0.02) 
-.101*** 
(0.02) 
-.102*** 
(0.02) 
-.101*** 
(0.02) 
Intercept 4.82*** 
(0.57) 
5.05*** 
(0.57) 
4.88*** 
(0.57) 
4.98*** 
(0.57) 
4.20*** 
(0.56) 
4.15*** 
(0.56) 
4.19*** 
(0.56) 
4.25*** 
(0.56) 
Log 
Likelihood 
-235714 -235718 -235720 -235722 -236687 -236682 -.236687  
Country 
Variance 
1.02 
(0.08) 
1.02 
(0.08) 
1.02 
(0.08) 
1.02 
(0.08) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
 
Individual 
Variance 
2.68 
(0.01) 
2.68 
(0.01) 
2.68 
(0.01) 
2.68 
(0.01) 
2.66 
(0.01) 
2.66 
(0.01) 
2.66 
(0.01) 
 
Observations 97 988 97 988 97 988 97 988 98 713 98 713 98 713  
Countries 74 74 74 74 74 74 74  
Notes: significance values: * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. *** p ≤ 0.001; Standard errors in parenthesis: Sources: Sources; 
EVS Longitudinal Data File; WVS Longitudinal Data File; Solt Frederick, Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database, version 5.0, October 2014. 
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Appendix 3 
The tables below lists the countries included in the three analyses: the macro level cross 
country analysis, multilevel analysis and time series analysis overtime. 
 
Table 11. List of countries included in the OLS time series regression analysis presented in results section 5.3 
 
Country Year Year Year Year  Country Year Year Year Year Year 
Argentina 1991 1999 2006 2013  Italy 1990 1999 2009   
Australia 1995 2005 2012   Japan 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Austria 1990 1999 2008   South 
Korea 
1990 1996 2001 2010  
Belgium 1990 1999 2008   Latvia 1990 1996 2008   
Bulgaria 1991 1999 2008   Lithuania 1990 1999 2008   
Belarus 1990 2000 2008   Mexico 1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 
Canada 1990 2000 2006   Moldova 1996 2002 2008   
Chile 1990 1996 2006 2011  Netherlands 1990 1999 2006 2012  
China 1990 1995 2001 2007 2012 New 
Zeeland 
1998 2004 2011   
Colombia 1998 2005 2012   Nigeria 1990 1995 2000 2011  
Czech. Rep. 1991 1999 2008   Norway 1990 1996 2007   
Denmark 1990 1999 2008   Peru 1996 2001 2012   
Estonia 1990 1999 2008   Philippines 1996 2001 2012   
Finland 1990 2000 2009   Poland 1989 1997 2005 2012  
France 1990 1999 2008   Portugal 1990 1999 2008   
Germany 1990 1999 2008   Romania 1993 1999 2005 2012  
Hungary 1991 1999 2008   Slovakia 1990 1998 2008   
India 1990 1995 2001 2006  Slovenia 1992 1999 2005 2011  
Ireland 1990 1999 2008   South 
Africa 
1990 1996 2006   
Spain 1990 1995 2000 2008  Turkey 1990 1996 2007   
Sweden 1990 1996 2006 2011  Great 
Britain 
1990 1999 2009   
USA 1990 1999 2006         
Sources: World value Survey Longitudinal Data file; European Value Study Longitudinal Data File 
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Table 12. List of countries included in the macro level OLS regression analysis (section 5.1) and the multilevel 
analysis (section 5.2). Hong Kong was included in the multilevel analysis, but not in the macro regression analysis 
(5.1) 
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year 
Albania 2008 Canada 2006 Estonia 2011 Indonesia 2006 
Argentina 2013 Chile 2011 Finland 2009 Iran 2007 
Australia 2012 China 2012 France 2008 Ireland 2008 
Austria 2008 Colombia 2012 Georgia 2009 Italy 2009 
Armenia 2011 Croatia 2008 Germany 2008 Japan 2010 
Belgium 2009 Cyprus 2011 Greece 2008 Kazakhstan 2011 
Brazil 2006 Czech Rep. 2008 Hungary 2009 Jordan 2007 
Bulgaria 2008 Denmark 2008 Iceland 2009 South 
Korea 
2010 
Belarus 2011 Ethiopia 2007 India 2006 Kyrgyzstan 2011 
Latvia 2008 Malaysia 2012 Mexico 2012 Morocco 2007 
Lithuania 2008 Mali 2007 Moldova 2008 Netherlands 2012 
Luxembourg 2008 Malta 2008 Montenegro 2008 New 
Zeeland 
2011 
Nigeria 2011 Philippines 2012 Romania 2012 Slovakia 2008 
Norway 2008 Poland 2012 Rwanda 2007 Vietnam 2006 
Peru 2012 Portugal 2008 Singapore 2012 Slovenia 2011 
South Africa 2011 Thailand 2008 Egypt 2008 Uruguay 2011 
Spain 2006 Turkey 2007 Great 
Britain 
2009 Zambia 2007 
Sweden 2011 Ukraine 2011 USA 2011   
Switzerland 2011 Macedonia 2006 Burkina 
Faso 
2007   
Sources: World value Survey Longitudinal Data file; European value Study Longitudinal Data File 
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